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CaseNo.20070909-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Jamis M. Johnson,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for securities fraud, a second degree felony.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Where the victims conveyed their dairy farm and its equipment to an outside
corporation in exchange for stock in the corporation, did the trial court properly mle that the
transaction constituted a disposition of securities for value under Utah law?
Standard of Review. Issues of statutory construction are questions of law reviewed
for correctness. See State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 314, \ 7, 78 P.3d 627. Similarly, a trial
court's ruling on a motion to dismiss presents a question of law reviewed for correctness.
See State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54,\ 10, 975 P.2d 489.

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in letting the State's expert opine on the
general reach of Utah's securities laws and the disclosures necessaiy thereunder, where the
State's expert never offered an opinion on defendant's guilt?
Standard of Review. Rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony are reviewed
for abuse of discretion. See State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah App. 1998).
3. Do defendant's due process and separation of powers claims fail where they rest
on an inaccurate portrayal of the State's legal arguments to the jury and, in any case, the trial
court properly instructed the jury on the law?1
Standard ofReview. Whether a statute is constitutional as applied raises a question of
law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, Tf 17, 174 P.3d 628.
4. Does this Court have jurisdiction to reach defendant's challenge to the trial court's
order denying his Renewed Motion for New Trial, where defendant's notice of appeal did
not perfect an appeal from that order?
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue.
5. Does this Court have jurisdiction to reach defendant's challenge to the trial court's
restitution order, where defendant's notice of appeal did not perfect an appeal from that
order?

1

The Issues and Standard of Review section of defendant's brief includes a claim,
raised as Issue 3, challenging the trial court's refusal to give defendant's proposed jury
instruction concerning expert testimony. See Aplt. Br. at 3. However, the Argument section
of defendant's brief does not address this issue as a separate claim but, rather, merely
addresses it in passing in his Issue 2. Thus, the State renumbers defendant's issues 4, 5, and
6 as issues 3, 4, and 5.
2

Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes and court rules are attached at Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1, 61-1-13, 61-1-21 (2000);
Utah R. App. P. 4; Utah R. Crim. P. 24; Utah R. Evid. 702, 704.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant and co-defendant Paul Schwenke were charged with one count of securities
fraud and one count of theft by deception (R.63-65). After a preliminary hearing, defendant
was bound over as charged (R.77-79). The trial court granted defendant's motion to sever
his and his co-defendant's cases (R.122-29,1030, 429).
Defendant moved to quash the bindover (R. 131-58). After a hearing, the trial court
granted the State's motion to dismiss the theft charge, but denied defendant's motion to
quash the securities fraud charge (R.541-44). Defendant's motions to dismiss and for partial
summary judgment were also denied (R.843-44,895-96,1199-2000,1201-03,1321-22).
At trial, defendant moved to dismiss the case at the close of the State's case-in-chief
(R. 1999:268). The court denied the motion (R. 1999:290). The jury convicted defendant as
charged (R.1451). Defendant's motion to arrest judgment was denied (R.1506-08,1612-14).
On June 6,2007, defendant was sentenced to a suspended term of one-to-fifteen years
in prison, one year in jail, and 36 months probation (R. 1677-80). He was also ordered to pay
restitution, jointly and severally with his original co-defendant, of $125,000 (Id.).
On June 15, 2007, defendant objected to the restitution order and requested a
restitution hearing (R. 1619-20). Defendant then moved for a new trial (R. 1621-23). On
3

July 2,2007, the trial court entered its final Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment (R. 167780). On October 10, 2007, the trial court entered an order denying defendant's Motion for
New Trial (R. 1964-79). On October 10 and 24,2007, the trial court held restitution hearings
(R.1980-82,1995-96). On November 8, 2007, defendant filed a notice of appeal (R.200002). On November 14,2007, defendant filed a Renewed Motion for New Trial (R.2003-05).
On December 5, 2007, the trial court reduced restitution to $120,000 (R.2032-42). On
February 11, 2008, the court denied defendant's second motion for new trial (R.2074).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ron Myers started moving his family dairy farm from Oregon to Millard County,
Utah around 1981. In 2000, Myers held the farm in a limited liability corporation, DairyKing Farm, with his son-in-law Jim Young and Young's brother. Young was the primary
manager of the farm, which had about 150 cows. "[T]he dairy industry wras tough" around
2000, and the farm "was struggling." The farm had just obtained a "good sized loan," and
"we were looking for some [financial help] at that point" (R. 1999:121,125,213-15).
In July 2000, a cattle seller, Duane Benton, told Young about "a guy," Paul
Schwenke, "who was interested in meeting some dairy farmers to talk about some
investment" (R. 1999:124). Young met with Schwenke in Fillmore in late July. Schwenke
introduced defendant, who was also at the meeting, as "the stock expert" (R. 1999:12527,301-03).

2

Paul Schwenke identified the cattle seller as Duane Bitman (R. 1999:302).
4

At the meeting, Schwenke "presented his plan, what, what he had in mind for, for
financing." Schwenke wanted to finance the farm's property and explained that he "had a
company called Americandairy.com." Schwenke "wanted to g e t . . . like 10-15,000 cows"
and "basically... open a public company[;] he wanted to sell stocks in Americandairy.com
a n d . . . that was where he was . . . going to get public financing" (R. 1999:127). Schwenke
told Young "he had about $10,000,000 worth of assets" to put into the venture, as well as
doctors and lawyers and "other investors" who wanted to invest in the corporation
(R. 1999:132-33,155,165). Schwenke said "there was another dairy involved inHolden and
he had hoped to get more" (R. 1999:134). Schwenke then "had [defendant] explain a little bit
about stocks, how they work and how this was going to, how this idea was going to work"
(R.1999:128).
Following defendant's explanation, the meeting turned to the farm's financial
situation. Schwenke "wanted to know how many cows we had" and "what kind of loans and
stuff we had on the farm." Young told the group that "we weren't in real bad shape but we
needed to get bigger." He explained, "[i]t's difficult to run a small dairy operation and we
needed, we had enough facilities for 600 cows and we needed to fill them up to make the
operation more efficient" (R.1999:130).
The next day, Young discussed Schwenke's plan with his father-in-law, Myers.
Young and Myers decided to accept Schwenke's offer, and agreed to meet with him at a
building in Salt Lake City, where defendant had his office (R.1999:134-36,307).

5

Both Young and Myers attended this second meeting in early August 2000 (R.
1999:138,163,215). They first met Schwenke and then proceeded to defendant's office (R.
1999:215-16). Defendant was again introduced, this time to Myers, as "a high-powered
lawyer" and "a security expert" from New York who "basically put together . . . stock
companies or securities companies" (R. 1999:217). The parties "talked about trading [] the
farm for shares in Americandairy.com" (R. 1999:13 7). And Myers explained that they had "a
substantial loan against the dairy with... Central Bank" and "there was no way" to complete
the transaction "without the refinance of Central Bank" (R. 1999:239-40).
Then, Myers, who "didn't understand stock at all," asked defendant to explain "how
the process [of a company going public] works" (R. 1999:218,309). Defendant told Myers
that, "basically... you put together the, basically the, the stock company and then at some
point you have... a public offering." According to defendant, "they could start this stock at
approximately $8 . . . , but at minimum they could start it at about $4 a share" (R. 1999:218,
231). When Myers asked whether he "could be involved in that public offering," defendant
"said it would be highly unusual but it could happen" (R. 1999:219).
Defendant then presented Young and Myers with a stock purchase agreement (R.
1999:137,220). Young and Myers stated "[tjhere was some things we wanted changed"; in
particular, they "wanted to have the ability to get the dairy back at some point if this thing
didn't work out" (R. 1999:220-21). After adding a provision allowing them to regain the
farm if the corporation did not have a public offering within two years, Young and Myers
met with defendant and Schwenke again on August 9, 2000 (R.1999:140,163,306).

6

At that meeting, defendant and Schwenke presented the revised stock purchase
agreement, a warranty deed, and a proxy agreement for signatures (R. 1999:222,312-13; St.
Exh. 1,5). "[Tjrying to get financing for our farm," Young and Myers signed the agreement
and transferred the farm's assets to Americandairy.com (R. 1999:138-40,142,144-45,233).
In addition to the real estate of the farm, Young and Myers transferred the farm
equipment, which conservatively had a replacement value of approximately $130,000 (R.
1999:150-51,236-38). Again, Myers knew "there was no way that we could perform [the
transaction] without the refinance of Central Bank

And that's the reason we signed the

warranty deed. The warranty deed was supposed to have been used only to refinance the
dairy and satisfy Central Bank period" (R. 1999:239-40). Moreover, Young and Myers
expected to get "financing, cattle, money for cattle" out of the deal. However, they never
received any actual financing (R. 1999:152).
Young signed the Stock Purchase Trade Agreement and deed on behalf of Dairy-King
Farms. Defendant executed the Agreement as CEO of Americandairy.com. Then, as
president of Americandairy.com, defendant executed one stock certificate transferring
150,000 shares to Myers and another certificate transferring 50,000 shares to Young
(R.1999:141-42,144,223-26,234; St. Exh. 1-3). At the time, no one else held shares in the
corporation (R. 1999:314). Schwenke then had Young sign a proxy to let Schwenke "run the
business ofAmericandairy.com without a meeting of the board" (R.1999:227-28).
Before Young and Myers signed the documents, neither defendant nor Schwenke
presented any additional "historical business information" about Americandairy.com or

7

information about "the current or past financial situation" of the corporation (R.1999:225,
230). Nor did they provide a complete list of the principals in the corporation, or any
information concerning the principals' financial background and history (R. 1999:155,225).
In addition, although defendant and Schwenke told Young and Myers there were "risks in
any stock transaction," they never enumerated those risks (R. 1999:145-46,230). Nor did
they offer any additional information concerning either the $10 million Schwenke
supposedly could contribute to the enterprise or the "possible market for the stock"
(R. 1999:155,230). And defendant never told Myers or Young that, during the period in
which this transaction was presented and then executed, he "was subject to disciplinary
proceedings before the Utah State Bar alleging misappropriation of client funds from an
event which occurred in October of 1992," had three federal tax liens against his property for
over $1,645,500.00, and had a Small Business Administration judgment against him
(R.1999:244,266-67;St.Exh.7-9,12).
According to Young, he and Myers probably would have entered into the transaction
with Schwenke even if defendant had not been involved. Still, defendant's position as an
attorney with a specialty in securities law "lent a great deal of credibility" to how he and
Schwenke presented it (R.1999:154,192).
Myers and Young never received any financing out of the August 9th transaction
(R. 1999:152,178,231). And, having transferred their deed to Americandairy.com, they
"were no longer able to go to a bank to get financing" (R. 1999:173). Within months of the
transaction, Myers and Young lost their farm and farm equipment (R.1999:178,237).

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his various motions to
dismiss because Myers' and Young's transfer of their farm to Americandairy.com for stock
constituted merely a change in their form of ownership of their farm, not a sale of securities
as required under the securities fraud statute. Defendant's claim fails because nothing in his
or Schwenke's description of the August 9th transaction suggested that Myers and Young
were merely changing their form of ownership of the farm. Moreover, even if the transaction
did constitute merely a change in their form of ownership, the securities statutes explicitly
define such transactions as sales of securities.
Point II. Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in letting the State's
security expert opine concerning the purposes of Utah's securities laws and the disclosures
necessary thereunder. Defendant's assertion that the expert gave impermissible legal
conclusions is not supported by case law, where the expert never gave any legal opinion
concerning whether defendant's conduct violated the law.

In addition, defendant's

contention that the expert misrepresented the law is not supported by the record. Finally,
even if the expert did exceed permissible limits on expert testimony, defendant has not
shown that he was prejudiced by that testimony where it was consistent with the law and the
trial court properly instructed the jury both on the law and on the weight jurors should give
expert testimony.
Point III. Defendant claims that the securities fraud statute, as applied in this case,
was both unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of

9

powers clause. Both of defendant's constitutional claims, however, rest on his allegation that
the State misrepresented the law at trial. Thus, to prove his claims, defendant must show
both that the State misrepresented the law at trial and that the trial court, by failing to correct
those misrepresentations in its jury instructions, adopted the State's misrepresentations.
Defendant has made neither showing here. Thus, his claim fails.
Point VI. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying the newly discovered
evidence claim raised in his two motions for new trial. Because defendant did not present
the newly discovered evidence in his first motion, his claim on appeal must go only to his
second motion. But defendant never filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court order
denying his second motion. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to reach defendant's claim.
Point V. Defendant challenges the trial court's post-judgment restitution order.
However, defendant never filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's restitution
order. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to reach defendant's claim.
ARGUMENT

I.
WHERE THE VICTIMS CONVEYED THEIR DAIRY FARM AND
EQUIPMENT TO AN OUTSIDE CORPORATION IN EXCHANGE
FOR STOCK IN THE CORPORATION, THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY RULED THAT THE TRANSFER CONSTITUTED A
SALE OF SECURITIES UNDER UTAH LAW
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the
securities fraud charge under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2000). See Aplt. Br. at 25-28. In
doing so, defendant acknowledges that Myers and Young transferred their Dairy-King Farms
to Americandairy.com in exchange for stock on August 9th. See id. at 26. Defendant
10

claims, however, that because Myers and Young were the sole shareholders in
Americandairy.com after the transfer, their "conversion from LLC to American Dairy was
not a disposition for value [as required under section 61-1-1], but rather was [merely] a
change in the form of ownership." Id. at 27. Thus, defendant argues, the trial court should
have granted his motions to dismiss. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
A.

Rules of statutory construction.
"'When interpreting statutes," this Court's "primary goal is to evince the true intent

and purpose of the Legislature,'" and "the best evidence of legislative intent" is "'the plain
language of the statute itself.'" In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, \ 6, 165 P.3d 1206 (citation
omitted). Thus, this Court "assume[s] that each term in the statute was used advisedly."
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted).
Moreover, statutory terms are "interpreted and applied according to [their] usually accepted
meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term[s] results in an application that is neither
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the
statute." State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, ^ 9, 36 P.3d 533 (citations omitted).
With these rules as a backdrop, "[t]he primary purpose of the securities laws is to
protect those who purchase securities," especially "'the inexperienced, confiding, and
credulous investor.'" State v. Dumke, 901 S.W.2d 100,102-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (citation
omitted). "[Securities laws[, therefore] are remedial in nature and should be broadly and
liberally construed to give effect to the legislative purpose." Payable Accounting Corp. v.
McKinley, 667 P.2d 15, 17-18 (Utah 1983); see also Capital General Corp. v. Utah Dept. of

11

Bus. Reg., Ill P.2d 494,496 (Utah App. 1989) ("[I]t is appropriate to broadly construe the
provisions of the [Utah's securities] Act to effectuate the legislative intention behind it.");
accord State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1,10 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1996); Caldwell v. State,
95 S.W.3d 563, 567 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
B.

Relevant statutes.
Defendant was charged with securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. § 61 -1 -1 (2000).

Under that statute, "[ijt is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to:"
(1)

Employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;

(2)

Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading; or

(3)

Engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1. "' Sale' or'sell' includes every contract for the sale of, contract to
sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value." Id. § 61-l-13(22)(a)
(2000). uFor value" is not statutorily defined. See id. § 61-1-13. However, "[t]he issuance
of a security under a merger, consolidation, reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification,
or acquisition of assets shall constitute the offer or sale of the security . . . , unless the sole
purpose of the transaction is to change the issuer's domicile." Id. § 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii).
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C.

The circumstances surrounding the August 9th transaction do not
support defendant's claim that the transaction did not constitute a
disposition of securities for value.
Nothing in the circumstances surrounding the August 9th transaction supports

defendant's contention that the transaction constituted merely a change in the form of Myers'
and Young's ownership of their farm, not a disposition of their farm for value.
Description of the Americandairy.com proposal. Neither Schwenke nor defendant
ever portrayed the victims' transfer of their farm from their LLC to Americandairy.com as
merely a change in the form of their ownership of the farm. To the contrary, from the
beginning, defendant and Schwenke presented the transaction as "an investment"
opportunity in which dairy farms would combine their resources into one corporation and
thereby spur investment by outsiders. The idea, according to Schwenke," was "to get. . .
like 10-15,000 cows" and "basically... open a public company[;] he wanted to sell stocks in
Americandairy.com and . . . that was where he was . . . going to get public financing"
(R.1999:124,127). According to Schwenke, "he had about $10,000,000 worth of assets . . .
to put into this, as well as doctors and lawyers" and "other investors" who wanted to invest
in the corporation (R.1999:132-33,155,165). In fact, "there was another dairy involved in
Holden and he hoped to get more" (R.1999:134).
Thus, nothing in defendant's or Schwenke's description of their proposal suggested
that the victims' transfer of their farm from their LLC to Americandairy.com would merely
effect a change in the form of their ownership of the farm. Rather, the proposal was all about
investment opportunities.

13

The Stock Purchase/Trade Agreement.

The primary document executed on

August 9th was the "Stock Purchase/Trade Agreement" (the Agreement).

Both the

Agreement's recitals and its substantive provisions indicate that the purpose of the contract
was to sell Americandairy.com stock to the victims (St.Exh.l, attached at Addendum B).
After defining Americandairy.com as Seller and Milk-King Dairy as Purchaser and
stating that Americandairy.com has "capital stock of 10,000,000 shares of .001 cents par
value common stock," the recitals state that "the Purchaser desires to purchase said stock and
the Seller desires to sell said stock" and that the Agreement is entered into "in order to
consummate the purchase and the sale of the Corporation's Stock." Consistent with these
recitals, the first substantive provision of the Agreement provides that, "at the closing of the
transaction contemplated hereby, the Seller shall sell . . . to the Purchaser certificates
representing such stock, and the Purchaser shall purchase from the Seller the Corporation's
Stock in consideration of the purchase price set forth in this Agreement." The second
provision defines the "amount and payment of purchase price," providing that "[t]he total
consideration and method of payment thereof are fully set out in Exhibit 'A' attached
hereto." Finally, Exhibit A of the Agreement defines "the 'Purchase Price'" the victims
would pay for the stock in Americandairy.com they would receive (St.Exh.l).
None of these provisions support defendant's contention that the August 9th
transaction was not a sale of securities for value. To the contrary, and consistent with
Schwenke's original proposal, each reflects that the purpose of the Agreement was for the
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victims to transfer their farm to Americandahy.com and thereby purchase a partial ownership
interest—as represented by the 200,000 shares of stock—in Americandairy.com.
Defendant's contention. Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant argues the
August 9th transaction was not a sale of securities for value. In doing so, defendant focuses
on evidence that, when the Agreement was signed, Myers and Young were "the only
shareholders of American Dairy." Aplt. Br. at 27. Thus, defendant asserts, the Agreement
"operated only to change the form of ownership of the dairy and equipment from the LLC to
American Dairy, both of which were wholly owned by Myers and Young." Id. at 27-28.
In support of his claim, defendant cites Capital General Corp. v. Utah Dept .of Bus.
Reg., Ill P.2d 494 (Utah App. 1989), and Premier Van SchaackRealty, Inc. v. Seig, 2002
UT App 173, 51 P.3d 24. See Aplt. Br. at 26-28. Neither case supports his claim.
In Capital General, Capital General Corp. (CGC) was charged with the unlawful
distribution of stock without registration. CGC had purchased 1,000,000 shares of a
company for $2000. 777 P.2d at 495. At the time, CGCs shares were the only shares issued
by the company; moreover, the company "had no actual business function at this time and its
sole asset was the $2000 CGC had paid for the 1,000,000 shares." Id. CGC then distributed
a portion of the shares "to approximately 900 of its clients . . . and other contacts,"
supposedly "to create and maintain goodwill" with those people. Id. at 495. It was
"undisputed that CGC did not receive any monetary or other direct financial consideration
from those receiving the stock." Id.
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On appeal, CGC argued that its distribution of the shares did not constitute an "offer
or sale" of the company's stock, i.e., a "disposition o f . . . a security for value" under the
Utah Uniform Securities Act. See id. at 496-97. In holding that it did, this Court rejected
CGC's argument that "the concept 'for value' mandates a direct exchange of economic
considerations between the transferor and transferee in order for the transaction to qualify as
an 'offer or sale' under [the Act]." Id. at 497. "[Vjalue," this Court held, is not limited to
"monetary benefit," but, rather, "can include enhanced abilities to borrow, raise capital, and
other general benefits associated with publicly held companies." Id. And such "economic
benefits render the disposition 'for v a l u e ' . . . , even though those benefits flow[] indirectly
from the marketplace rather than directly from the transferees." Id.
Defendant appears to argue that Capital General does not support a finding of "for
value" in this case because Myers and Young "were at all times the only shareholders of
American Dairy." Apt. Br. at 27. But defendant fails to explain why Myers' and Young's
shareholder status rendered the exchange of their farm to Americandairy.com for stock not
"for value" under Capital General. According to the evidence, Myers and Young were "at
all times" the sole shareholders in the corporation only because the proposal Schwenke
presented to them—which envisioned other dairy fanners joining the venture and becoming
shareholders—never bore fruit. Defendant cites no case law holding that the first people to
purchase stock in a new venture have not purchased stock "for value" merely because, at that
point, they are the sole shareholders in the venture.
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Alternatively, defendant asserts there was no "value" under Capital Generalbecause
"both the dairy and equipment allegedly given to American Dairy were in fact so
encumbered as to be valueless." Aplt. Br. at 27. However, to make his case, defendant relies
on evidence not presented at trial. See id, (citing evidence produced at post-trial restitution
hearing). Moreover, as Capital General held, "value" is not limited to "monetary benefit"
flowing "directly from the transferees." Capital General, 111 P.2d at 497.

Rather,

"economic value," including "enhanced abilities to borrow, raise capital, and other general
benefits" resulting from the corporation's new assets "rendered] the disposition 'for value'
. . . , even though those benefits flow[] indirectly from the marketplace." Id,
Finally, according to defendant, the August 9th stock transfer was not "for value"
even under this latter category because "American Dairy was not a public company and there
were no other shareholders who stood to profit from the distribution of shares to Myers and
Young through either cash considerations or the creation of a market." Aplt. Br. at 26-27.
Before transferring stock to Myers and Young, however, Americandaiiy.com had no assets
and "engaged in no apparent business operations." Capital General, 111 P.2d at 497. By
inducing Myers and Young to convey their farm to the company, Americandairy.com now
had assets to its name, thereby increasing both the marketability of the corporation to other
dairy farmers as an investment option and the possibility of monetary benefit to the
corporation's promoters from other investors.
In sum, Capital General does not support defendant's claim that the stock transfer
here was not a disposition of securities "for value."
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Neither does Premier Van Schaack Realty. In that case, Premier Van Schaak Realty
(Premier) sought to enforce a brokerage fee payment provision in a real estate listing
agreement involving one of Seig's properties. 2002 UT App 173, % 1. Under the agreement,
Seig agreed to pay Premier a brokerage fee if, during the listing period, anyone ""locate[d] a
party who is ready, willing and able to buy, sell or exchange . . . the Property, or any part
thereof, at the listing price . . . or any other price or terms to which [Seig] may agree . . . . ' "
Id. at T| 2. During the listing period, Seig formed a limited liability company (LLC) with
three other individuals, and conveyed his property to the LLC for a 40% interest in the LLC
and other benefits. Id. at f 4. Upon learning of the transaction, Premier demanded its
commission under the listing agreement. Id. at % 6. The trial court rejected Premier's claim,
ruling that the transaction between Seig and the LLC "was not a sale or exchange pursuant to
the Agreement because it lacked consideration." Id.
On appeal, Premier argued that Seig's transfer of his property to the LLC was a "sale
or exchange" under the listing agreement because "Sieg received consideration from [the
LLC]," including "a 40% interest in [the LLC]." Id. at 110. This Court rejected Premier's
claim. In so doing, this Court distinguished between the sale of real estate—in which "once
a person sells property, appreciation, depreciation, or total loss of the property is of no
concern since the sale severs the seller from any interest in the property"—and the
conveyance of real estate to a business entity in exchange for an interest in that entity—in
which the conveyor "undertakes the risks of an investor" and "assumes the risk that the value
of investment will increase or decrease over time, or that the investment may be completely
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lost." Id. at Tj 13. According to this Court, because Seig's transfer of his property to the LLC
required him to assume the risks of an investor, the transfer did not constitute a sale of real
estate under the listing agreement, and thus, Seig did not have to pay Premier any
commission on the transfer. Id.
Defendant argues Premier supports his contention that "Myers' and Young's
conversion [of their farm] from LLC to American Dairy was not a disposition for value, but
rather was a change in the form of ownership." Aplt Br. at 26-27. But, as defendant notes,
Premier did not address the meaning of "for value" in the securities context; rather, it
"considered whether a 'sale' or 'exchange' of real property occurred to trigger a contractual
commission provision." Id. at 26. Thus, Premier provides no authoritative insight as to
what constitutes "disposition of... a security for value" under Utah's securities laws.
Moreover, to the extent Premier speaks to that issue at all, it undermines defendant's
contention, rather than supports it. The very reason this Court held that no sale of real estate
occurred in Premier was because Seig's transfer of his property to an LLC was an
investment of real estate—presumably governed by securities laws—not a sale of real
estate—governed by contracts law applicable to real estate listing agreements. See Premier
Van Schaak Realty, 2002 UT App 173,ffij8-13.
In sum, neither the facts of this case nor the case law cited by defendant supports his
contention that the August 9th transaction was not a disposition of securities for value.
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D. The securities fraud statute does not support defendant's claim
that the August 9th transaction did not constitute a disposition of
securities for value.
Even if the August 9th transaction merely changed the form of Myers' and Young's
ownership of their farm, it still constituted a disposition of securities for value under Utah 's
securities laws.
In asserting that the transaction did not fall within the reach of Section 61-1-1,
defendant notes that "Section 61-1-1 limits its application to conduct occuning 'in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security.'" Aplt. Br. at 25 (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-1). Defendant also notes that "'sale'" is defined to "'include[] every
contract for sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for
value'" and "'offer'" is defined to "'include[] every attempt or offer to dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security for value'" Id. (quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(22)(a), (b)) (emphasis in original).3
Defendant ignores section 61-l-13(22)(c), which gives "examples of the definitions
[of 'sale' and 'offer'] in Subsections 22(a) and (b)." Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(22)(c)
(2000).

Specifically, defendant ignores section 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii), which expressly

provides that "the issuance of a security under a merger, consolidation, reorganization,
recapitalization, reclassification, or acquisition of assets shall constitute the offer or sale of

3

Although defendant's citation is actually to Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(l)(v)(i), see
Aplt. Br. at 25-26, that statutory reference appears to be a typographical error, since section
61-1-13(1) defines "affiliate" and has no subsection (v)(i).
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the security issued .. ., unless the sole purpose of the transaction is to change the issuer's
domicile." Id. § 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii).
Under the plain language of section 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii), even securities transactions
that merely change the fonn of ownership of one's assets from an LLC to a coiporation fall
within the reach of section 61-1-1, "unless the sole purpose of the transaction is to change
the issuer's domicile." Id. In this case, nothing in the evidence suggested that the August
9th transaction occurred solely "to change the issuer's domicile. Id. Thus, under section 611-13 (22)(c)(vii), the August 9th transaction fell within the reach of section 61-1-1, even if it
merely changed the form of Myers' and Young's ownership of their farm.
Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions to dismiss.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
LETTING THE STATE'S EXPERT OPINE ON THE GENERAL
REACH OF UTAH'S SECURITIES LAWS AND THE
DISCLOSURES NECESSARY THEREUNDER, WHERE THE
STATE'S EXPERT NEVER OFFERED AN OPINION ON
DEFENDANT'S GUILT
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State's
securities expert to offer legal conclusions concerning what constitutes a violation of the
securities fraud statute under which defendant was charged. See Aplt. Br. at 28-42.
According to defendant, the expert's testimony "should have been excluded . . . because it
was riddled with impermissible legal conclusions" and "incorrect interpretation^]" of the
law. Id. at 29,31. And, defendant contends, admitting the expert's testimony, "coupled with
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the trial court's refusal to provide [defendant's] curative instruction, greatly and unduly
prejudiced [him]." Id. at 42. Defendant's claim fails.
A.

Governing law.
At the time of defendant's trial, rule 702 provided that, "[i]f scientific, technical, or

other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert... may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702.4 Rule 704 provides that "testimony in the
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704(a).
Under these rules, expert "opinions that 'tell the jury what result to reach' or 'give
legal conclusions' [are] impermissible." State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ^f 15, 155 P.3d
909. Ssuch testimony '"tend[s] to blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge,
jury, and witness.'" Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, "there is 'a danger that a juror may
turn to the [witness's legal conclusion] rather than the judge for guidance on the applicable
law.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Notwithstanding this limitation, a trial court "'has wide discretion in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony.'" State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602,607 (Utah App. 1998)
(citation omitted). And "[n]o 'bright line' separates permissible ultimate issue testimony
under rule 704 and impermissible 'overbroad legal responses' a witness may give during
questioning." Davis, 2007 UT App 13, f 16.
4

Rule 702 was amended effective November 1, 2007, but the amendments do not
apply here and therefore do not affect the analysis in this case.
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Thus, "expert testimony may be appropriate in 'securities fraud cases because the
technical nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average layman or a subject
within the common experience and would help the jury understand the issues before them.'"
State v. Larsen {Larsen II), 865 P.2d 1355,1361-62 (Utah 1993)) (holding trial court didnot
abuse discretion by allowing expert to testify as to materiality of omitted information in
securities fraud case, even though "materiality" was "ultimate issue" jury had to decide).
Such testimony may include the meaning or reach of legal terms if it "aid[s] the jury in
resolving the factual disputes" at hand. Id. at 1361 n.l 1. Indeed, such testimony may be
particularly helpful "where the subject matter is not one of common observation or
knowledge, or in other words, where witnesses because of particular knowledge are
competent to reach an intelligent conclusion and inexperienced persons are likely to prove
incapable of forming a correct judgment without skilled assistance." Patey v. Lainhart, 1999
UT 31, Tf 22, 977 P.2d 1193 (upholding admission of expert testimony as to what caused
injury in negligence case); cf. United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1171-72 (10th Cir.
2005) (testimony that embraces ultimate issue of guilty "is permissible as long as the
expert's testimony assists, rather than supplants, the jury's judgment"); United States v.
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285,1294 (2d Cir. 1991) (no error in allowing expert testimony giving
"general background on federal securities regulation and the filing requirements [under a
government] Schedule").
Consequently, a "semantic characterization of [an expert's] testimony as a legal
conclusion does not, without more, move the testimony outside the scope of [rule 704, the]

23

ultimate-issue rule." Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1363. Rather, the deciding factor in detemiining
whether expert testimony transgresses the pennissible line in Utah appears to be whether the
expert expressly opines that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.
In Larsen II, therefore, the supreme court found no error in the trial court letting an
expert opine "that some of the material Larson had omitted from the securities documents
could have been important or significant to an investor," where the expert "did not, as Larsen
suggests, testify that Larsen was guilty, nor did [the expert] testify that, as a matter of law,
the facts satisfied the legal standard of materiality." Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1361 & n. 10.
Similarly, in State v. Hany, 873 P.2d 1149, 1154-55 & n.9 (Utah App. 1994), this Court
upheld the admission of "expert testimony concerning the materiality of certain
misrepresentations and omissions Harry allegedly made or failed to make." The Hany court
also held that the expert's testimony "that selling away is illegal" was not improper where
the "expert did not testify that Harry actually sold away from [his firm]," but instead, "[t]hat
factual determination was left to the jury." Id., 873 P.2d at 1154 n.9.
Conversely, in State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App. 1996) (citation
omitted), this Court found error because the expert's testimony "clearly state[d] legal
conclusions [regarding guilt] because the witnesses tie[d] their opinions to the requirements
of Utah law." See also Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ^ 14-22 (in illegal possession of firearms
case, expert's opinion regarding what constitutes "possession" under charging statute and
concluding that Davis's conduct constituted "possession" under the statute was
impermissible because expert "'applied the facts of the case to the prohibition[s] in the
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statute, resulting] in the rendering of a legal conclusion [that Davis had committed the crime
alleged].'") (citations omitted).
Finally, even if an expert's testimony does include impermissible legal conclusions,
defendant must still show that the expert's testimony was prejudicial. See Larsen II, 865
P.2d at 1363. Such testimony is not prejudicial where it "matche[s] the [law] set forth in the
jury instruction^]." State v. LaCount, 732 N.W.2d 29,35-36 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (no error
in allowing expert testimony where expert's "description of investment contracts matched
the definition set forth in the jury instruction"), affd, 750 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 2008), cert,
denied, 129 S.Ct. 631(2008); see also People v. Prendergast, 87 P.3d 175, 183 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2003); People v. Lurie, 673 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (App. Div. 1998). Nor is it prejudicial
where the trial court "correctly admonishe[s] the jury as to the relative roles of expert
testimony and opinion evidence," "instructs] the jury to accord no unusual deference to an
expert's opinions," and gives "careful instructions regarding the legal definition[s] and
requirements of the term[s] . . . as used in the [governing] statute." Larsen II, 865 P.2d at
1363; see also Lurie, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
B.

Proceedings below.
Before opening statements, the trial court twice instructed the jury that the court "will

instruct you on the law that you must follow and apply in deciding your verdict"
(R.1999:7,10).
Michael Hines, the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, was
then called as the State's securities expert (R. 1999:38-39). The State began by asking Hines
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to identify the purposes of securities regulation. After the trial court overruled defendant's
relevance objection, Hines answered that the two main purpose of securities law were "to
protect investors" and "to guard against fraud." Hines explained that "in the area of
securities . . . , it is a seller beware market.... In other words, the seller has to make sure
that they disclose all material facts to the person that's purchasing that, that [security]."
When defendant objected to Hines's characterization as a "misstatement of law," the trial
court stated, "I've qualified him as an expert. That's his opinion. You can cross-examine
him on that" (R.1999:49-52).
Hines then explained that securities laws are "trigger[ed]" when "a person is either
directly or indirectly in connection with the offer or sale of a security" (R. 1999:52). And
Hines stated that "[tjhere are two ways that we normally see that the security statute can be
violated": "misrepresentation of material facts or the omission of material fact in light of
circumstances under which a statement is made not misleading. That's one. And the second
is basically a course of conduct that will operate as a fraud against others" (R.1999:53).
Hines next opined as to some of the "important facts that would have to be disclosed
in all circumstances" in connection with the sale of securities. Hines testified "the general
test is is it an important fact that a purchaser of normal prudence would want to know before
they make their decision." Such facts would "certainly" include "financial statements of the
entity . . . , the history of any of the control people[,] whether they have been civilly sued,
whether they've had administrative actions, bankruptcies and things like that." Other
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important facts include "[competition in the market, conflicts] of interest," and "risk
factors" involving the security (R. 1999:55-56).
When defendant objected that "61-1-1 does not require that you disclose all of these
things, it just says if you make a disclosure it has to be accurate," the State responded, "[i]t
also speaks to [] omissions." The trial court overruled defendant's objection. Hines then
identified "important risk factors" that should be disclosed, including "the business success
of the control persons of the company,... how capitalized or how much money they have to
work with . . . , how many people are you selling this to and how many people have a piece
of this for their money." Hines noted that "all of the disclosure" also "goes to" half-truths,
where "[t]he statute says that you have to disclose all material facts in light of circumstances
under which a statement is made, not misleading." After the court overruled defendant's
objection that Hines' testimony "[mjisstates the law," Hines clarified that the half-truth issue
"is only triggered by some predicate statement that's made" (R. 1999:56-58).
When Hines explained that the duty to disclose applied to people both directly and
indirectly offering securities, defendant asked that Hines' response be stricken because "that
. . . goes to the jury instructions." Instead, the court instructed the jury "that at some point in
this trial the court is going to give you instructions with respect to a, issues of law that you,
that will govern your deliberations" (R.1999:61).
When asked whether there were "any other important significant factors" that should
be disclosed, Hines responded, "I don't think it's possible to specifically list all the
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circumstances that would need to be disclosed. Again, the test is does a reasonable prudent
investor, is that a fact that they would want to know" (R. 1999:62).
On cross-examination, defendant asked Hines to discuss the elements of the securities
fraud statute. In connection with his questions, defendant used "a chart that is large" that had
"the statute on it" (R. 1999:65-66). Defendant then led Hines through the statute, questioning
Hines as to how he analyzed transactions to determine whether a violation of the statute had
occurred.

In particular, defendant questioned Hines concerning how he analyzed

transactions under the "misleading" part of the statute, oftentimes posing hypothetical to
Hines to elicit when an omitted statement did and did not render a prior statement misleading
(R. 1999:68-83). Partially through Hines' cross-examination, the prosecutor noted that
defendant had been asking "for a long time" about legal conclusions despite defendant's
prior objections to such conclusions earlier in the trial (R.1999:81).
After then briefly questioning Hines on the statutory definition of "sale," especially
that portion requiring disposition of a security "for value," defendant returned to the
securities fraud statute, questioned Hines on the requirement that disclosures or omissions be
"material," and confirmed that "material" is "what a reasonable investor would think was
important" (R. 1999:84-89). Defendant again questioned Hines concerning the steps he took
to analyze a transaction under section 61-1-1 (R.1999:90-92,105-08).
Defendant confirmed with Hines that had any of the elements of the statute not been
met, Hines "wouldn't feel too good about prosecuting" (R. 1999:93-94). Defendant then
asked if "it [was] fair to say that you've rarely testified that somebody wasn't guilty once
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you got on the stand" and whether "there [had] ever been a time . . . when you testified that
any criminal defendant in any case you've been involved in was not guilty?" The court
sustained the prosecutor's objections, noting that Hines "would never instruct the jury to find
a person guilty or not guilty. That would be an improper use of an expert witness"
(R. 1999:96). Defendant then asked Hines whether, "if you determine that any of these
elements [of section 61-1-1] are not, are not met would you recommend... that this case be
dismissed." Hines replied, "I have done that before" (R. 1999:98).
Over the State's objection, defendant then repeatedly questioned Hines on what
disclosures he, as president ofAmericandairy.com, was required to make under section 61-11. When Hines set out what he believed was the test, defendant objected. The court
overruled the objection, stating, "Well, you asked the question.

He answered it"

(R. 1999:104).
On re-direct, the State asked Hines again to address whether the "financial exposure
of officers" was required under section 61-1-1. Hines responded, "It is my opinion that
financial disclosure or the financial background and their business background of officers of
a, of a company that you're buying stock in is important because I think the prudent investor
would want to know how successful they had been at previous business ventures before they
buy stock in that company. Also if they're subjected to any lawsuits,... it may affect their
ability for the new company to survive" (R. 1999:114).
In his case-in-chief, defendant called Nathan Whitney Dredge, a published corporate
and securities attorney, as his securities expert (R. 1999:372,375,380). Dredge testified that
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although he agreed with "much o f Hines's testimony, "I departed on some points." Dredge
explained that "I depart" when it comes to "what one considers in terms of materiality and,
and that's where I go to the supreme court language that it is a totality of the circumstances,
it is the economic reality of the transaction" that "affect[s] the definition of a security,
definition of offer and sale and a, what is material and what is not material" (R. 1999:39597).
Then, defendant, as he had done with Hines, walked Dredge through the language of
the securities fraud statute. In the process, Dredge opined that no security was involved in
this case because "this transaction is simply a change in the form of business ownership for
Mr. Young and Myers" and, therefore, did not involve a security based on "what was the
intent of [securities] statutes and... what the [SJupreme [Cjourthas said" (R. 1999:398,401).
Thus, although "[technically it is an offer and sale and technically it is a security," it was not
a security under the securities fraud statute "[b]ecause it's not the type of transaction that the
. . . legislatures want to govern" (R.1999:402-03).
Dredge further testified that, although he had sometimes acted as "the initial officer or
director [of a corporation] for a day" in order to complete a corporate securities transaction,
he did not have to "give a whole bunch of disclosures" when he did so (R. 1999:401,403).
According to Dredge, although an officer may have an affirmative duty to disclose "a bunch
of stuff "[in] some occasions," that duty does not exist "in all occasions" (R. 1999:418).
In further explaining why the transaction was not the type covered by section 61-1-1,
Dredge again referenced the Supreme Court's "economic reality" test. Dredge repeated that
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because Myers and Young merely changed the form of ownership of their farm and did not
relinquish control of their farm, no securities transaction took place (R. 1999:406-07). In this
context, Dredge opined, defendant's introduction to Myers and Young as an "attorney" or
"president" of the corporation was not material, nor was whether defendant "had some sort
of expertise," "had worked on Wall Street," or had an "ongoing [bar] disciplinary action"
(R.1999:424-26).
On cross-examination, Dredge testified that defendant's disclosures to Myers and
Young were "adequate" (R. 1999:455). The State then asked Dredge whether he was familiar
with a Supreme Court case not yet referenced by him concerning the definition of stock.
Although Dredge did not "recall the facts of the case," he was "familiar with . . . language
used by the [Sjupreme [CJourt" that when "an instrument is labeled stock it possesses all of
the traditional characteristics, a court is not required to look at the economic substance of the
transaction." When defendant objected to the State's representation of the holding in the
case, the court overruled defendant's objection (R. 1999:456-58).
On re-direct, defendant and Dredge clarified the meaning of the Supreme Court case
the State had cited (R. 1999:470,473). Under any definition provided by the Supreme Court,
Dredge concluded, the transaction here did not involve the sale or purchase of a security as
contemplated by the securities fraud statute (R. 1999:473-74).
At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
You are to be governed in your deliberations solely by the evidence introduced
in this trial and the law as stated to you by me.
(R. 1428; Instr. 1) (emphasis added).
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A person who, by education, study, and experience has become an
expert... may give his or her opinion as to any such matter in which he or she
is versed and which is material to the case. You should consider such expert
opinion and should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound,
however, by such an opinion.
If an expert has expressed an opinion of the law which is in conflict
with these instructions, you are to disregard the opinion of the expert witness.
(R. 1436; Instr. 8) (emphasis added).
In addition, Instruction 15 set out the elements of the crime with which defendant had
been charged, and Instruction 17 set out definitions of material tenns included within those
elements (R. 1444, 1446; Instr. 15, 17).
C. Expert testimony that does not specifically comment on the facts of the
case but only addresses what types of transactions are generally
covered by securities laws and what general requirements those laws
impose does not constitute impermissible testimony.
Defendant attacks Hines's testimony on three grounds. First, he asserts Hines's
testimony "was riddled with impermissible legal conclusions" and "opinion[s] on the
governing law." Aplt. Br. at 29. Second, defendant argues "[t]he impennissibility of Mr.
Hines' testimony is magnified by the incorrect interpretation he gave to the law in question."
Id. at 31. Finally, defendant contends that Hines' testimony was prejudicial. See id. at 39.
1. Inadmissible legal conclusions.
Defendant's fundamental contention is that Hines's testimony contained legal
conclusions concerning Utah securities law and "[a]n expert witness is not allowed to
provide purely legal conclusions." Aplt. Br. at 28 (holding and capitalization omitted).
However, as stated, expert testimony "may be appropriate in 'securities fraud cases
because the technical nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average
32

layman.'" Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1361-62 (citation omitted). Moreover, expert testimony
may include legal conclusions "' where the subject matter is not one of common observation
or knowledge, or . . . where witnesses because of particular knowledge are competent to
reach an intelligent conclusion and inexperienced persons are likely to prove incapable of
forming a correct judgment without skilled assistance." Patey, 1999 UT 31, \ 22; see also
LarsenII, 865 P.2d at 1361 & n.l 1;Dazey, 403 F.3dat 1171-72;Bilzerian, 926 F.2dat 1294.
In this case, Hines's direct testimony included no impermissible legal conclusions
under this standard. As defendant notes, Hines did testify on the purposes of securities laws
and the disclosures generally required under them. See Aplt. Br. at 29-30. However, at no
time during direct examination was Hines asked whether defendant's conduct in this case
met those disclosure requirements and at no time did Hines sua sponte offer an opinion on
that question. &eR.1999:38-61.
Consequently, nothing in Hines's testimony on direct examination was impermissible.
See Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1361-62 (rejecting claim that expert's testimony "as to the
'materiality' of information Larsen allegedly had omitted from securities-related documents"
constituted improper "'legal conclusion' that Larsen's omissions violated [the securities
fraud statute]" where "materiality, as it relates to the importance of the omitted information,
was an 'ultimate issue'" upon which expert testimony may be admitted); see also
Prendergast, 87 P.3d at 183; LaCount, 732 N.W.2d at 35-36; Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1171-72;
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1294.
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2. Incorrect legal conclusions.
Alternatively, defendant challenges Hines's testimony as containing two assertions of
law that are inconsistent with the plain language of section 61-1-1 (2). See Aplt. Br. at 31-37.
As stated, section 61-1-1(2) prohibits any person, in connection with the sale or offer of
securities, to "[m]ake any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2).
a. General disclosures required under section 61-1-1(2).
Defendant claims that Hines "insistently]" testified that, under section 61 -1 -1 (2), "the
important facts that would have to be disclosed in all circumstances are numerous. But the
general test is is it an important fact that a purchaser of normal prudence would want to
know before they make their decision.'" Aplt. Br. at 32, 34 (citing R. 1999:55-57).
According to defendant, Hines misstates the law because section 61 -1 -1 (2) "is not a general
disclosure statute requiring individuals involved in a securities transaction to disclose
everything a reasonable investor might want to know," but rather "requires only that if a
statement is made, it is unlawful to omit a material fact necessary to make that [] statement
not misleading, in light of the circumstances in which the predicate statement is made. " Id.
But when first asked how the securities fraud statute could be violated, Hines testified
that one way was when there "is the misrepresentation of material facts or the omission of
material fact in light of circumstances under which a statement is made not misleading"
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(R. 1999:53) (emphasis added). Thus, at the very beginning of his testimony, Hines
accurately described the law defendant claims he misrepresented.
Moreover, when Hines testified that the general test as to whether a fact is
"important" is whether it is a fact "that a purchaser of normal prudence would want to know
before they make their decision," defendant objected that "61-1-1 does not require that you
disclose all of these things." Hines countered that the statute "says that you have to disclose
all material facts in light of circumstances under which a statement is made, not misleading."
In other words, Hines explained, "[i]f there's a rest of the story to be told you need to tell
that so an investor can make [an] intelligent decision. That is only triggered by some
predicate statement that's made though" (R. 1999:58) (emphasis added). Thus, "[y]ou take
the total mix of all facts and what should have been important under those set of
circumstances" (R. 1999:58-59). Again, therefore, Hines acknowledged that the extent to
which material disclosures are necessaiy depends on what prior statements were made.
Finally, on cross-examination, defendant revisited Hines's testimony concerning "an
omission and... a half-truth" (R. 1999:67). Hines reiterated that, for the omissions provision
to apply, "[tjhere has to be some as I call it a predicate statement," "[y]ou have to say
something to trigger it" (R. 1999:69). And, when defendant walked Hines through the
analysis the jury would have to conduct in determining whether section 61-1-1(2) was
violated, Hines again confirmed that, under the omissions part of the statute, the "question is
is there an important fact that was not told that the ordinary prudent investor would have
wanted to know to make that statement not misleading"; "[t]he omission of a material fact
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has to be in light of circumstances under which a statement is made by anyone that if left
alone is misleading" (R. 1999:73-74). In other words, Hines agreed, "this statute... doesn't
say youVe got to disclose a whole bunch of stuff, it just says if you disclose something it
dang well better be true" (R.199:79-80).
In sum, Hines's testimony on both direct examination and cross was consistent both
with the plain language of section 61-1-1(2) and defendant's own interpretation of that
section. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2); Aplt. Br. at 32-34. Consequently, defendant's
claim that Hines's testimony misstates the law under section 61-1-1(2) fails.
b. Specific disclosures required of "controlled persons."
Defendant also challenges Hines's contention that section 61-1-1(2) imposes greater
disclosure requirements on "officers, presidents or other so-called 'control persons'" than it
does on other people. Aplt. Br. at 34. According to defendant, this testimony misstates the
law because "there is no greater or lesser duty of disclosure upon an officer than there is
upon any other seller or purchaser of securities under the statute." Id. (emphasis in original).
Hines's testimony, however, is supported by the law. In Securities and Exchange
Comm yn v. Merchant Capital LLC, 483 F.3d 747,750 (11th Cir. 2007), two people—Wyer
and Beasley—formed Merchant "to participate in the business of buying, collecting, and
reselling charged-off consumer debt from financial institutions." Neither individual had
experience in that industry. Id. at 751. Wyer, whose "most recent business was conducting
direct marketing for financial institutions," "had declared personal bankruptcy because that
business defaulted on certain obligations that he had personally guaranteed." Id. To raise
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money for their new venture, Wyer and Beasley sold interests in limited liability paitnersliips
over which Merchant served as managing general partner. Id. at 752-53. However, in
selling those securities, Wyer failed to disclose his prior personal bankruptcy. Id. at 770.
The appellate court held that, "under the facts in the record, a reasonable investor would have
been interested in Wyer's previous personal banlcruptcy, and that it was thus materially
misleading to omit the information," where "Wyer... put his experience in issue by touting,
in great detail, Wyer's business experience." Id. at 770.
In Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir.
2001), defendants sought investors from Suez Equity in a venture in which a man named
Mallick was the venture's "founder, principal executive, and controlling shareholder."
However, in promoting the investments, defendants provided Suez-Equity with a modified
report on the venture's principals, which "omitted negative events in Mallick's business and
financial history," including "three tax liens against Mallick personally" and "several civil
lawsuits that had been decided against Mallick." Id. On appeal, the court held that those
"misrepresentations . . . led plaintiffs to appraise the value of [the venture's] securities
incorrectly by assuming the competency of Mallick, the [venture's] principal." Id. at 96.
Both of these courts' holdings are consistent with the plain language of section 61-11(2). As stated, that section prohibits any person, in connection with the sale or offer of
securities, to "[m]ake any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading." Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1(2). A person's position as
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CEO and president of the venture involved constitutes one "of the circumstances under
which [statements] are made." Id. Under the plain language of section 61-1-1 (2), therefore,
that circumstance necessarily affects what disclosures must be made regarding that person to
ensure that "statements made [by or about him] are not misleading." Id.
Consequently, defendant's claim that Hines's testimony misstates the law concerning
officers and other control persons also fails.
D.

Defendant's challenge to Hines's testimony also fails because he was
not prejudiced by that testimony.
Defendant's challenge to Hines's testimony also fails for lack of prejudice.

According to defendant, "the prejudice caused by [Hines's] testimony was great" because
Hines was the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, and "[c]ertainly
the jury would give special attention to the Director's opinion as to what the law requires and
what conduct violates the law, even if it's the wrong one." Aplt. Br. at 39. "This is
particularly true," defendant contends, "where the trial court failed to correct the errors" and
"the State did not focus either its presentation or summation of evidence on predicate
statements rendered misleading by an omission." Id.
As discussed, however, defendant has not shown that Hines's testimony concerning
Utah securities law was either improper or inaccurate. A defendant is not prejudiced by an
expert's testimony if the expert "accurately stated the law." Lurie, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 63; see
also Pendergast, 87 P.3d at 183.
Moreover, contrary to defendant's claim, the State did address the predicate
statements on which defendant's charge was based. In his opening statement, the prosecutor
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described the case against defendant as one in which "important information... was shoved
off to the side, and was painted in a light which didn't give the true and complete picture of
what really is going on here" (R. 1999:17). Then, in closing argument, the prosecutor
identified at least two material statements on which defendant's charge was based: that
defendant was "a stock expert" and that defendant stated the stock "is going to $4 to $8."
The prosecutor then added that defendant "makes all kinds of materiality facts," but "I'm not
going to insult your, your intelligence. You have heard the evidence here" (R. 1999:527-28).
"So yes, you bet ya, you've got statements of material fact." And, the prosecutor continued,
"[o]missions, omissions. You've got evidence, verbal evidence, testimonial evidence"
(R. 1999:529-30). Thus, contrary to defendant's contention, the State did "focus . . . its
presentation [and] summation of the evidence on predicate statements rendered misleading
by an omission." Aplt. Br. at 39.
Third, to the extent defendant disagreed with Hines's opinions concerning the law,
defendant was able to and did present his own expert—a securities attorney—to challenge
Hines's opinions. Given Dredge's qualifications as an expert—both having extensive
experience in securities practice and being published in the area (R.1999:375,380)—it is
unlikely that "the jury would [have] give[n] special attention to [Hines's] opinion as to what
the law requires and what conduct violates the law, even if it's the wrong one." Aplt. Br. at
39.
Finally, contrary to defendant's contention, the trial court did properly instruct the
jury on the law and the weight to be given expert testimony on the law. Both before trial
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began and before jury deliberations, the court instructed the jury that "[y]ou are to be
governed in your deliberations solely by the evidence introduced in this trial and the law as
stated to you by me" (R.1999:7,10;R.1428;Instr.l). In addition, during Hines's testimony,
the court noted that Hines's testimony was only "his opinion" (R. 1999:52). And, at the close
of evidence, the court instructed the jury that it was "not bound... by [expert] opinion" and
"[i]f an expert has expressed an opinion of the law which is in conflict with these
instructions, you are to disregard the opinion of the expert witness" (R.1436; Instr.8). The
court also instructed the jury as to the elements of the crime the State had to prove and the
statutory definitions of terms included within those elements (R. 1443-44,1446; Instr. 15,17).
See Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1363 (finding no prejudice where trial court "correctly
admonishe[s] the jury as to the relative roles of expert testimony and opinion evidence,"
"instructs] the jury to accord no unusual deference to an expert's opinions," and gives
"careful instructions regarding the legal defmition[s] and requirements of the term[s]... as
used in the [governing] statute"); Lurie, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 63. 5
In sum, none of defendant's claims of prejudice withstand scrutiny.
<u
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In his brief, defendant claims the trial court erred "by refusing . . . to offer [his]
proposed curative jury instruction that affirmative disclosure of material facts is not
required." Aplt. Br. at 37. Defendant's one-paragraph discussion of this issue, however, is
inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (brief "shall contain... citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, ^f 20,
63 P.3d 72 (appellate court "is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may
dump the burden of argument and research") (citations omitted). This Court may also reject
defendant's claim because the proposed instruction was, on its face, confusing. See R. 1663.
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Because defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Hines's testimony, defendant's challenge to that testimony fails.
III.
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS AND SEPARATION OF
POWERS CLAIMS FAIL, WHERE THEY REST ON AN
INACCURATE PORTRAYAL OF THE STATE'S LEGAL
ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY AND WHERE THE TRIAL
COURT, IN ANY CASE, PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON THE LAW
Defendant claims that "Utah Code Section 61-1-1 is unconstitutional as applied to
[him] in this case because it is both unconstitutionally vague and contrary to the separations
of powers clause." Aplt. Br. at 42. Defendant's vagueness claim rests on his contention that
"the State both before and throughout trial applied an incorrect theory and interpretation of
Section 61 -1 -1 (2) that informed the jury they could convict [him] for failure to affinnatively
disclose all facts." Id. at 43. Similarly, defendant's separation of powers claim rests on
"[t]he State's and [its expert's] attempts to interpret Section 61-1-1(2) as ageneral disclosure
statute" Id. at 45. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
Even assuming arguendo the State mischaracterized the law in this case, that alone
cannot support defendant's due process and separation of powers claims. Under wellestablished law, "'[misstatements of the law do not prejudice a defendant where the error
has been satisfactorily corrected.'" State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925,930 (Utah App. 1998)
(quoting State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37,44 (Utah 1996), and other cases). And the error has
been satisfactorily corrected if "the trial court provide[s] the jury with a complete instmction
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on the law and direct[s] the jurors to follow the law as stated by the court." Id. (citing State
v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 555 (Utah App. 1993)).
Thus, to succeed on his due process and separation of powers claims, defendant must
show at a minimum both that the prosecutor misstated the law and that the trial court's jury
instructions failed to correct it. Defendant cannot make that showing in this case.
First, as discussed, the State did not misrepresent the elements of securities fraud
under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). See pp. 32-38 supra.
Second, even if the State had misrepresented that law, the jury instructions were
adequate to correct it. The jury was twice instructed that the court "will instruct you on the
law that you must follow and apply in deciding your verdict" (R.1999:7;R.1999:10). In
addition, after one of defendant's objections during Mr. Hines's testimony, the trial court
reiterated that "the court is going to indicate to the jury that at some point in this trial the
court is going to give you instructions with respect to a, issues of law that you, that will
govern your deliberations. And a, at that time a, the court will instruct you as to what the
law is" (R. 1999:61). Then, in its written instructions, the court reiterated that the jury was
"to be governed in your deliberations solely by the evidence introduced in this trial and the
law as stated to you by me" (R.1428;Instr.l). The jury was also instructed that "[i]f an
expert has expressed an opinion of the law which is in conflict with these instructions, you
are to disregard the opinion of the expert witness" (R.1436;Instr.8). In addition, it was
instructed that to find defendant guilty, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, "[i]n
connection with the offer, sale or purchase of a security" to Myers and Young, defendant
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[djirectly or indirectly made an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
engaged in an act, practice or course of business which operated or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon [Myers and/or Young].
(R. 1443 Jury Instr.15). The jury was also instructed that a "material fact" is "something
which a buyer of ordinaiy intelligence and prudence would think to be of importance in
determining whether to buy or sell a security" and that "fraud" is "any untme statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading"
(R.1446-47:JuryInstr.l7).
Defendant does not acknowledge these instructions, let alone demonstrate that they
failed to correct any alleged misstatement of the law by the State. See Aplt. Br. at 42-44. In
fact, the sole instruction with which defendant takes issue is Jury Instruction 18. See id. at
44-45. Jury Instruction 18 provided:
One of the allegations against the Defendant in the Charge addressed in Count
1, is that the Defendant, either directly or indirectly, made an untrue statement
of material fact, or omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.
Under this theory, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the individual
investor believed the statements to be true, nor that he relied upon the
statements in his decision making process, so long as the statements were
made such that a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have relied
upon the statements in making an investment decision.
(R. 1448 Jury Instr.18). According to defendant, this instruction supports his vagueness
claim because it "invites the jury to ignore Young's testimony [that he did not rely on
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defendant's statements in buying the Americandairy.com stock] and instead substitute its
own judgment of what information is important." Aplt. Br. at 45.
Defendant does not cite a single legal authority supporting his contention that this
instruction "is not constitutional." Id, In fact, Jury Instruction 18*s mandate that the jury
determine materiality based on an objective reasonable person standard is consistent with
Utah law. See Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1362 (defining "factually material" in securities fraud
context as "likely to influence a reasonable investor") (emphasis added); S &F Supply Co.
v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1974) (defining "material fact" as "something which a
buyer or seller ofordinaiy intelligence and prudence would think to be of some importance
in detennining whether to buy or sell") (emphasis added).
In sum, defendant has not shown either that the State misrepresented the law
applicable to his case or that the trial court's jury instructions were insufficient to correct any
such error. Defendant's constitutional challenges to the law as applied, therefore, fail.
IV.
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REACH DEFENDANT'S
CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS
RENEWED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHERE DEFENDANT'S
NOTICE OF APPEAL DID NOT PERFECT AN APPEAL FROM
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his "Motion for
New Trial and Renewed Motion [for New Trial] on the grounds that, inter alia, [defendant]
failed to establish the grounds for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence." Aplt.
Br. at 48. In asserting his claim, defendant relies only on the "newly discovered evidence"
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produced in his Renewed Motion for New Trial. Because defendant failed to file a timely
notice of appeal from the trial court's order denying his Renewed Motion for New Trial, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to reach defendant's claim.
A.

Applicable law.
This Court lacks jurisdiction over any trial court orders from which no proper notice

of appeal has been filed. See Reisbeckv. HCA Health Ser\\ of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, lj 5,2
P.3d 447 ("Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives [appellate] court[s] of
jurisdiction over the appeal").
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides when notices of appeal must be
filed from final judgments. Rule 4(a) provides, "In a case in which an appeal is permitted as
a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal... shall be
filed . . . within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from."
Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Rule 4(c) then provides that "[a] notice of appeal filed after the
announcement of a decisionJudgment, or order but before entry of the judgment or order
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof." Utah R. App. P. 4(c).
Rule 4(b), however, provides an exception to rules 4(a) and 4(c) when a timely
motion for new trial has been filed:
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the
time for all parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the
order disposing of the motion:
(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
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(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but
before entry of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be
treated as filed after entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such
a notice of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment
To appeal from a final order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), a
party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal within the
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order.
Finally, "[a] motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 10 days after entry of
the sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before expiration of the time
for filing a motion for new trial." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c).
B.

Proceedings below.
Defendant's jury trial ended on March 7,2007 (R. 1999:478). His sentencing hearing

was held on June 6, 2007 (R. 1612-14). On June 15, 2007, defendant objected to the
restitution order and requested a restitution hearing (R. 1619-20). On June 20, 2007,
defendant filed a timely Motion for New Trial (R. 1621-23,1624-70). On July 2, 2007, the
trial court entered its final judgment on defendant's conviction (R. 1677-80).
In his Motion for New Trial, defendant included a newly discovered evidence claim
(R. 1952-53). Defendant listed the newly discovered evidence as (1) discovery of a
"previously unknown witness . . . familiar with the Milk King Dairy operation" with "direct
information concerning the viability of the dairy operation..., which directly impacted the
dairy's viability and value prior to its limited involvement with [defendant]"; (2) discovery
of a "Trustee's Deed " which "discloses a competitive bid auction at the foreclosure by
Central Bank which established a fair market value for the dairy of $161,000.00, while the
dairy had debts exceeding $324,000.00 at the time of foreclosure—within months of the
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dairy's limited involvement with [defendant]"; and (3) discovery of "a Federal Tax Lien for
approximately $13,000 [that] was recorded against the dairy within months of Johnson's
limited involvement with Mr. Young and Mr. Myers" (R. 1652-53). The trial court rejected
defendant's newly discovered evidence claim, however, in part because "[ajside from
defendant's representations in his memoranda, he presented] no evidence or affidavits
relating to the evidence he purports to have discovered" (R.1977).
After denying defendant's Motion for New Trial on October 10,2007, the court held
restitution hearings on October 10 and October 24,2007 (R. 1964-79,1980-82,1995-96). On
November 8, 2007, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 2000-02). On November
14, 2007, defendant filed an untimely Renewed Motion for New Trial "based upon new
evidence produced by the State at the Restitution Hearings" (R.2003-05,2006-12). On
December 5,2007, the trial court entered a Restitution Order (R.2032-42). On February 11,
2008, the trial court heard argument on defendant's Renewed Motion for New Trial and
denied the motion (R.2074). An order attached to defendant's brief suggests the court
entered a final order denying defendant's motion on August 12,2008. See Aplt. Br. at Add.
G. No copy of that order, however, appears in the record on appeal. In any event, defendant
did not file a new notice of appeal after the trial court entered its order.
C.

Because defendant's claim goes only to record evidence raised in his
Renewed Motion for New Trial and because defendant did not file a
timely notice of appeal from the trial court's denial of that motion, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to reach defendant's claim.
In asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions for new

trial, defendant relies on "evidence provided by the State for and during the Restitution
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Hearings." Aplt. Br. at 47. That evidence, however, was never produced in support of
defendant's original Motion for New Trial. See R.1977 (trial court denying defendant's
newly discovered evidence claim raised in Motion for New Trial because "[a]side from
defendant's representations in his memoranda, he presented] no evidence or affidavits
relating to the evidence he purports to have discovered). Rather, it was produced only during
defendant's restitution hearings, which occurred after the trial court had already denied
defendant's Motion for New Trial (R.1964-79,1980-82,1995-96). Thus, to rely on that
evidence to challenge the denial of his request for new trial, defendant must be challenging
the trial court's denial of his Renewed Motion for New Trial, not his Motion for New Trial.
Defendant's Renewed Motion for New Trial, however, was not filed until four months
after the trial court entered its final judgment in this case (R. 1677-80,2003-2012). Thus, his
motion was untimely under rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. P.
24 (requiring motion for new trial be filed no later than ten days after final judgment).
More importantly, even assuming defendant's Renewed Motion for New Trial was
timely, the only notice of appeal filed in this case was filed on November 8, 2007, six days
before defendant filed his Renewed Motion for New Trial (R.2000-02). Defendant's notice
of appeal, therefore, could not perfect an appeal from the trial court's order denying that
motion. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (requiring notice of appeal from denial of new trial motion
be filed within 30 days afterfinalorder denying motion).

48

This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to reach defendant's challenge to that order.
See Reisbeck, 2000 UT 48, % 5.6
V.
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REACH
DEFENDANT'S RESTITUTION CLAIM WHERE DEFENDANT'S
NOTICE OF APPEAL DID NOT PERFECT AN APPEAL FROM
THE TRIAL COURT'S RESTITUTION ORDER
Finally, defendant challenges the trial court's final order requiring him to pay
$ 120,000 in restitution, entered after two restitution hearings held October 10 and 24,2007.
See Aplt. Br. at 51-55. Defendant's notice of appeal, however, was untimely as to the trial
court's final restitution order. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to reach his claim.
A. Governing law.
In most cases, where restitution is determined at sentencing, rule 4(a), of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, will govern when a notice of appeal from a final judgment of
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Even if this Court reaches defendant's claim, it fails. First, defendant presents no
explanation as to why public UCC records were not discoverable before trial. See Aplt. Br.
at 46-51. Nor does he explain why, knowing that Myers and Young had a loan with Central
Bank on the farm property, defendant did not question Myers or Young on the amount of
that loan at trial. See id. Second, the whole premise of defendant's claim is that the value of
the property at issue is its "fair market value." See id. at 50. Defendant concedes that "fair
market value" is "'what the owner could expect to receive, and the amount a willing buyer
would pay to the true owner for the [property].'" Id. (quoting State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278,
284 (Utah App. 1996)). As the trial court ruled when rejecting defendant's claim in his first
Motion for New Trial, that definition of "fair market value" "does not require the subtraction
of related debts, liens, or other encumbrances on the property" (R. 1973). Indeed, it seems a
truism that the fair market value of a $400,000 home does not decrease merely because the
current owner has a mortgage on it. Consequently, evidence that Myers and Young
transferred the real property on which their farm was located and farm equipment having a
purchase or replacement value exceeding $130,000, to Americandairy.com was sufficient to
find that the transfer involved at least $10,000 worth of property.
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conviction will be sufficient to appeal the restitution order. However, where a final
judgment of conviction in a criminal case is entered before final detemiination of restitution,
a timely notice of appeal from the underlying judgment does not necessarily constitute a
timely notice of appeal from the order determining restitution. See State v. Gamer, 2005 UT
6, 106P.3d729.
In Garner, Gamer entered a Seiy plea but failed to file a timely notice of appeal from
the trial court's original final judgment. See id. at ^f 2. Instead, Gamer filed notices of
appeal from an amended judgment emphasizing the conditional nature of Gamer's plea and
then from a second amended order "setting the amount of restitution." Id. atfflf2-4.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed this Court's holding that a "modification
detemiining the amount of restitution" does not "create[] a new final judgment and beg[i]n a
new time period for appeals." Id. at ^j 14-16. In reaching that conclusion, the supreme court
distinguished a civil case in which it had held that '"orders made on attorney fees subsequent
t o . . . judgment were modifications or amendments in a "material matter'"" that restarted the
time for filing a notice of appeal. Id. atf 14 (quoting ProMax Development Corp. v. Raille,
2000 UT 4 4 11, 998 P.2d 254). In ProMax, the court noted, "we held that, 'in the interest
of judicial economy,' attorney fees must be determined before the judgment becomes final
for purposes of an appeal, and that such a holding 'will "enabl[e] an appellant to appeal all
issues, including an award of attorney fees, in a single notice of appeal.'"" Id. at ^ 16
(quoting ProMax, 2000 UT 4, f 14 (citation omitted)). However, "civil cases and criminal
cases implicate principles of judicial economy in different ways." Id. And, in criminal
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cases, u[aj criminal defendant... would frequently be disadvantaged by staying the time for
filing an appeal until an exact amount for restitution could be determined."

Id.

Consequently, "where orders of restitution remain open to be decided at a later date, the
subsequent entry of the amount of restitution is not a new and final judgment for puiposes of
appealing the underlying merits of a criminal conviction." Id. at f 17.
The clear implication of Garner's conclusion that a defendant may not be able "to
appeal all issues . . . in a single notice of appeal," Garner, 2005 UT 6, ^ 16, is that, just as a
timely notice from a post-judgment restitution order may not be timely to perfect an appeal
from the underlying judgment, see id. at ^flj 14-16, a timely notice of appeal from the
underlying judgment may not be timely to perfect an appeal from a post-judgment restitution
order. Rather, to appeal from a post-judgment restitution order, a defendant must file a
timely notice of appeal as to that order. Cf. State v. Abbot, 2000 UT App 342U at *1 (per
curiam) (noting that timely appeal from restitution order does not constitute timely appeal
from underlying judgment, stating that defendant "appeals from the restitution order entered
in this case" and that defendant "did not file a timely appeal from the conviction and
sentence, and [therefore] no further issues are properly before this court"); Salt Lake City v.
Guffey, 2001 UT App 17U at 1 (per curiam) (holding defendant's notice of appeal, filed
more than 30 days after final judgment but within 30 days of post-judgment order denying
motion to arrest judgment, "was untimely as to her conviction because it was not filed within
30 days of the entry of the conviction"). And, to be timely as to that order, the notice of
appeal must be filed "within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from,"
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Utah R. App. P. 4(a), or "after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order [in the
restitution proceeding] but before entry of the judgment or order," Utah R. App. P. 4(c); City
o/St. George v. Smith, &14P.2d 1154,1155-56 (UtahApp. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that
"decision" in rule 4(c) "is broadly defined to cover final judgments, interlocutory orders, or
'the first step leading to a judgment'" in proceeding from which appeal is taken) (quoting
Black's Law Dictionary 366 (5th ed. 1979)).
B.

Proceedings below.
On June 6, 2007, as part of sentencing, defendant was ordered to pay restitution,

jointly and severally with Paul Schwenke, in the amount of $ 125,000 (R. 1612-14). On June
15, 2007, defendant filed an objection to the restitution order and requested a restitution
hearing (R. 1619-20). On July 2, 2007, the trial court entered its final Sentence, Judgment,
and Commitment (R. 1700-22). On October 10, 2007, the trial court entered an order
denying defendant's first Motion for New Trial (R. 1964-67). On October 10 and 24, 2007,
the trial court held restitution hearings (R. 1995-96). At the close of those hearings, the trial
court did not announce a restitution amount but, rather, "[took] the matter under advisement"
(R.2075 (2d) at 132). On November 8,2007, defendant filed a notice of appeal (R.2000-02).
On December 5, 2007, the trial court reduced restitution to $120,000 (R.2032-42).
C.

Analysis.
Defendant's notice of appeal, filed after the trial court denied his first motion for new

trial but before the trial court announced its decision concerning restitution, did not perfect
an appeal from the trial court's restitution order. First, the notice of appeal was not filed
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"within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a).
Thus, the notice of appeal was not timely under rule 4(a). See id. Second, the notice of
appeal was filed before the trial court announced any "decision, judgment, or order" in the
post-judgment restitution proceeding. Utah R. App. P. 4(c). Thus, the notice of appeal was
also untimely under rule 4(c). See id.; see also State v. R.C., 2005 UT App 105U at *1
(memorandum decision) (per curiam) (holding rule 4(c) did not save juvenile's appeal
following entry of two no-contest pleas where notice of appeal was filed before final
judgment and u[t]he record does not reflect that the . . . court announced a 'decision,
judgment or order,' regarding the judgment and sentence prior to entry of the same"); Smith,
813 P.2d at 1155-56.
This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's challenge to the
court's restitution order. See Reisbeckv. HCA Health Serv. of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48,1J 5,2
P.3d 447 ("Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives [appellate] court[s] of
jurisdiction over the appeal.").7

7

Even if this Court were to reach defendant's claim, it would fail. First, because
Schwenke's acts were foreseeable given the nature of the August 9th transaction, defendant
can be held liable for Schwenke's conduct concerning the farm after August 9th. See, e.g.,
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335, 338-39 (Utah 1980) (holding that, if defendant, "by his
wrongful conduct creates a condition of peril, his action can properly be found to be the
proximate cause of a resulting injury, even though later events which combined to cause the
injury may also be classified as negligent, so long as the later act is something which can
reasonably be expected to follow in the natural sequence of events"); see also State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201,1215 (Utah 1993) (holding that "sufficient intervening cause" to relieve one
from liability for criminal conduct must be both "'unforeseeable and one in which [the]
accused does not participate,'" a cause "'so extraordinary that it is unfair to hold [the]
accused responsible'") (citation omitted).
53

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm both defendant's conviction and
the trial court's restitution order.

Respectfully submitted March *S, 2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
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KAREN A. KLUCZNIK

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

Second, although the trial court may have erred in directly equating Myers' and
Young's losses to the $50,000 loan taken out against the farm by Schwenke and the $70,000
certificate of deposit Myers lost when the farm went under, the evidence at the restitution
hearing was sufficient to support the trial court's $120,000 restitution order. In particular,
Myers testified that he lost about $58,000 from the CD when the bank foreclosed on the loan
for which it was collateral and spent the other $12,000 paying off farm bills
((R.2075(l):165)). In addition, Myers testified, he and Young lost another "$70,000 or so"
in feed costs for feeding Schwenke's cows, which $70,000 Young testified came from their
cash reserve (R. 2075(1):203;R.2075(2):26,28).
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R U L E 4.

APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN

(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions,
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the
time for all parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the
order disposing of the motion:
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or
not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted,
under Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; or
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but
before entry of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be
treated as filed after entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such
a notice of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment. To
appeal from a final order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party
must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal within the
prescribed time measured from"the entry of the order.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after
the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the
judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of-appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. A motion filed before
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court

otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice
of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time
or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever
occurs later.
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases.
Upon a showing that a criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal,
the trial court shall reinstate the thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A
defendant seeking such reinstatement shall file a written motion in the sentencing court and serve the prosecuting entity. If the defendant is not represented
and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel. The prosecutor shall have 30
days after service of the motion to file a written response. ' If the prosecutor
opposes the motion, the trial court shall set a hearing at which the parties may
present evidence. If the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant has demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to
appeal, it shall enter an order reinstating the time for appeal. The defendant's
notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days
after the date of entry of the order.
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined
in an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in
the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice of
appeal.

RULE 24.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a
new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 10 days after entry
of the sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before
expiration of the time for filing a motion for new trial.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either
in evidence or in argument.

RULE 702.

TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

RULE 704.

OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE

(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as J:o
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.

61-1-13.

Definitions,

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means a person that, directly or indirectly, through one or
more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or is under common
control with a person specified.
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a broker-dealer who
represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect
purchases or sales of securities. "Agent" does not include an individual
who represents:
(a) an issuer, who receives no commission or other remuneration,
directly or indirectly, for effecting or attempting to effect purchases or
sales of securities in this state, and who:
(i) effects transactions in securities exempted by Subsection
61-l-14(l)(a), (b), (c), (i), or (j);
(ii) effects transactions exempted by Subsection 61-1-14(2);
(iii) effects transactions in a covered security as described in
Sections 18(b)(3) and 18(b)(4)(D) of the Securities Act .of 1933; or
(iv) effects transactions with existing employees, partners,
officers, or directors of the issuer; or
(b) a broker-dealer in effecting transactions in this state limited to
those transactions described in Section 15(h)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. A partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer
or issuer, or a person occupying a similar status or performing similar
functions, is an agent only if he otherwise comes within this definition.
(3) "Broker-dealer" means any person engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others or for his own
account. "Broker-dealer" does not include:
(a) an agent;
(b) an issuer;
(c) a bank, savings institution, or trust company;
(d) a person who has no place of business in this state if:
(i) the person effects transactions in this state exclusively with
or through:
(A) the issuers of the securities involved in the transactions;
(B) other broker-dealers; or
(C) banks, savings institutions, trust companies, insurance companies, investment companies as defined in the
Investment Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing
trusts, or other financial institutions or institutional buyers,
whether acting for themselves or as trustees; or
(ii) during any period of 12 consecutive months the person does
not direct more than 15 offers to sell or buy into this state in any
manner to persons other than those specified in Subsection
(3)(d)(i), whether or not the offeror or any of the offerees is then
present in this state;
(e) a general partner who organizes and effects transactions in
securities of three or fewer limited partnerships, of which the person
is the general partner, in any period of 12 consecutive months;
(f) a person whose participation in transactions in securities is
confined to those transactions made by or through a broker-dealer
licensed in this state;

(g) a person who is a real estate broker licensed in this state and
who effects transactions in a bond or other evidence of indebtedness
secured by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by a n
agreement for the sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire
mortgage, deed or trust, or agreement, together with all the bonds or
other evidences of indebtedness secured thereby, is offered and sold as
a unit;
(h) a person effecting transactions in commodity contracts or commodity options; or
(i) other persons as the division, by rule or order, may designate,
consistent with the public interest and protection of investors, as not
within the intent of this subsection.
(4) "Buy" or "purchase" means every contract for purchase of, contract
to buy, or acquisition of a security or interest in a security for value.
(5) "Commodity" means, except as otherwise specified by the division by
rule:
(a) any agricultural, grain, or livestock product or byproduct,
except real property or any timber, agricultural, or livestock product
grown or raised on real property and offered or sold bj^ the owner or
lessee of the real property;
(b) any metal or mineral, including a precious metal, except a
numismatic coin whose fair market value is at least 15% greater than
the value of the metal it contains;
(c) any gem or gemstone, whether characterized as precious, semiprecious, or otherwise;
(d) any fuel, w r hether liquid, gaseous, or otherwise;
(e) any foreign currency; and
(f) all other goods, articles, products, or items of any kind, except
any work of art offered or sold by art dealers, at public auction or
offered or sold through a private sale by the owner of the work.
(6) "Commodity contract" means any account, agreement, or contract
for the purchase or sale, primarily for speculation or investment purposes
and not for use or consumption by the offeree or purchaser, of one or more
commodities, whether for immediate or subsequent delivery or whether
delivery is intended by the parties, and whether characterized as a cash
contract, deferred shipment or deferred delivery contract, forward contract, futures contract, installment or margin contract, leverage contract,
or otherwise.
(a) Any commodity contract offered or sold shall, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, be presumed to be offered or sold for
speculation or investment purposes.
(b) (i) A commodity contract shall not include any contract or
agreement which requires, and under which the purchaser receives, within 28 calendar days from the payment in good funds
any portion of the purchase price, physical delivery of the total
amount of each commodity to be purchased under the contract or
agreement.
(ii) The purchaser is not considered to have received physical
delivery of the total amount of each commodity to be purchased
under the contract or agreement when the commodity or commodities are held as collateral for a loan or are subject to a lien of
any person when the loan or lien arises in connection with the
purchase of each commodity or commodities.

(7) (a) "Commodity option" means any account, agreement, or contract
giving a party to the option the right but not the obligation to
purchase or sell one or more commodities or one or more commodity
contracts, or both whether characterized as an option, privilege,
indemnity, bid, offer, put, call, advance guaranty, decline guaranty, or
otherwise.
(b) It does not include an option traded on a national securities
exchange registered with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission or on a board of trade designated as a contract market by
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division of Securities charged
with the administration and enforcement of this chapter.
(9) "Division" means the Division of Securities established by Section
61-1-18.
(10) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of Commerce.
(11) "Federal covered adviser" means a person who is registered under
Section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or is excluded from the
definition of "investment adviser" under Section 202(a)(ll) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
(12) "Federal covered security" means any security that is a covered
security under Section 18(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 or rules or
regulations promulgated thereunder.
(13) "Fraud," "deceit," and "defraud" are not limited to their commonlaw meanings.
(14) "Guaranteed" means guaranteed as to payment of principal or
interest as to debt securities, or dividends as to equity securities.
(15) (a) "Investment adviser" means any person who, for compensation,
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who,
for compensation and as a part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.
(b) "Investment adviser" also includes financial planners and other
persons who, as an integral component of other financially related
services, provide the foregoing investment advisory services to others
for compensation and as part of a business or who hold themselves out
as providing the foregoing investment advisory services to others for
compensation.
(c) "Investment adviser" does not include:
(i) an investment adviser representative;
(ii) a bank, savings institution, or trust company;
(iii) a lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose performance of these services is solely incidental to the practice of his
profession;
(iv) a broker-dealer or its agent whose performance of these
services is solely incidental to the conduct of its business as a
broker-dealer and who receives no special compensation for them;
(v) a publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news column, news
letter, news magazine, or business or financial publication or
service, of general, regular, and paid circulation, whether communicated in hard copy form, or by electronic means, or otherwise, that does not consist of the rendering of advice on the basis
of the specific investment situation of each client;

(vi) any person who is a federal covered adviser; or
(vii) such other persons not within the intent of Subsection (15)
as the division may by rule or order designate.
(16) "Investment adviser representative" means any partner, officer,
director of, or a person occupying a similar status or performing similar
functions, or other individual, except clerical or ministerial personnel,
who:
(a) (i) is employed by or associated with an investment adviser who
is licensed or required to be licensed under this chapter; or
(ii) has a place of business located in this state and is employed
by or associated with a federal covered adviser; and
(b) does any of the following:
(i) makes any recommendations or otherwise renders advice
regarding securities;
(ii) manages accounts or portfolios of clients;
(iii) determines which recommendation or advice regarding
securities should be given;
(iv) solicits, offers, or negotiates for the sale of or sells investment advisory services; or
(v) supervises employees who perform any of the foregoing.
(17) (a) "Issuer" means any person who issues or proposes to issue any
security or has outstanding a security that it has issued.
(b) With respect to a preorganization certificate or subscription,
"issuer" means the promoter or the promoters of the person to be
organized.
(c) With respect to:
(i) interests in trusts, including but not limited to collateral
trust certificates, voting trust certificates, and certificates of
deposit for securities; or
(ii) shares in an investment company without a board of
directors, "issuer" means the person or persons performing the
acts and assuming duties of a depositor or manager under the
provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under
which the security is issued.
(d) With respect to an equipment trust certificate, a conditional
sales contract, or similar securities serving the same purpose, "issuer"
means the person by whom the equipment or property is to be used.
(e) With respect to interests in partnerships, general or limited,
"issuer" means the partnership itself and not the general partner or
partners.
(f) With respect to certificates of interest or participation in oil, gas,
or mining titles or leases or in payment out of production under the
titles or leases, "issuer" means the owner of the title or lease or right
of production, whether whole or fractional, who creates fractional
interests therein for the purpose of sale.
(18) "Nonissuer" means not directly or indirectly for the benefit of the
issuer.
(19) "Person" means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, a
limited liability company, an association, a joint-stock company, a joint
venture, a trust where the interests of the beneficiaries are evidenced by
a security, an unincorporated organization, a government, or a political
subdivision of a government.

(20) "Precious metal" means the following, whether in coin, bullion, or
other form:
(a) silver;
(b) gold;
(c) platinum;
(d) palladium;
(e) copper; and
(f) such other substances as the division may specify by rule.
(21) "Promoter" means any person who, acting alone or in concert with
one or more persons, takes initiative in founding or organizing the
business or enterprise of a person.
(22) (a) "Sale" or "sell" includes every contract for sale of, contract to
sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value.
(b) "Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every attempt or offer to dispose
of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security
for value.
(c) The following are examples of the definitions in Subsections
(22)(a) and (b):
(i) any security given or delivered with or as a bonus on
account of any purchase of a security or any other thing, is part of
the subject of the purchase, and has been offered and sold for
value;
(ii) a purported gift of assessable stock is an offer or sale as is
each assessment levied on the stock;
(iii) an offer or sale of a security that is convertible into, or
entitles its holder to acquire or subscribe to another security of
the same or another issuer is an offer or sale of that security, and
also an offer of the other security, whether the right to convert or
acquire is exercisable immediately or in the future;
(iv) any conversion or exchange of one security for another
shall constitute an offer or sale of the security received in a
conversion or exchange, and the offer to buy or the purchase of the
security converted or exchanged;
(v) securities distributed as a dividend wherein the person
receiving the dividend surrenders the right, or the alternative
right, to receive a cash or property dividend is an offer or sale;
(vi) a dividend of a security of another issuer is an offer or sale;
or
(vii) the issuance of a security under a merger, consolidation,
reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, or acquisition of
assets shall constitute the offer or sale of the security issued as
well as the offer to buy or the purchase of any security surrendered in connection therewith, unless the sole purpose of the
transaction is to change the issuer's domicile.
(d) The terms defined in Subsections (22)(a) and (b) do not include:
(i) a good faith gift;
(ii) a transfer by death;
(iii) a transfer by termination of a trust or of a beneficial
interest in a trust;
(iv) a security dividend not within Subsection (22)(c)(v) or (vi);
(v) a securities split or reverse split; or

(vi) any act incident to a judicially approved reorganization in
which a security is issued in exchange for one or more outstanding securities, claims, or property interests, or partly in such
exchange and partly for cash.
(23) "Securities Act of 1933," "Securities Exchange Act of 1934," "Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935," and "Investment Company Act of
1940" mean the federal statutes of those names as amended before or after
the effective date of this chapter.
(24) (a) "Security" means any:
(i) note;
(ii) stock;
(iii) treasury stock;
(iv) bond;
(v) debenture;
(vi) evidence of indebtedness;
(vii) certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement;
(viii) collateral-trust certificate;
(ix) preorganization certificate or subscription;
(x) transferable share;
(xi) investment contract;
(xii) burial certificate or burial contract;
(xiii) voting-trust certificate;
(xiv) certificate of deposit for a security;
(xv) certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or
mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such
a title or lease;
(xvi) commodity contract or commodity option;
(xvii) interest in a limited liability company; or
(xviii) in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing.
(b) "Security" does not include any:
(i) insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract under
which an insurance company promises to pay money in a lump
sum or periodically for life or some other specified period; or
(ii) interest in a limited liability company in which the limited
liability company is formed as part of an estate plan where all of
the members are related by blood or marriage, there are five or
fewer members, or the person claiming this exception can prove
that all of the members are actively engaged in the management
of the limited liability company. Evidence that members vote or
have the right to vote, or the right to information concerning the
business and affairs of the limited liability company, or the right
to participate in management, shall not establish, without more,
that all members are actively engaged in the management of the
limited liability company.
(25) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the United
States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
(26) "Working days" means 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
exclusive of legal holidays listed in Section 63-13-2.

(27) A term not defined in Section 61-1-13 shall have the meaning as
established by division rule. The meaning of a term neither defined in this
section nor by rule of the division shall be the meaning commonly accepted
in the business community.

61-1-1. Fraud unlawful.
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

61-1-21. Penalties for violations,
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates any
provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16, or who willfully
violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who willfully violates Section
61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false or misleading in any material
respect.
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1:
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was
committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to
be obtained was worth $10,000 or less;
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if, at the time the crime was
committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to
be obtained was worth more than $10,000.
(3) No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he
proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or order.
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STOCK PURCHASE/TRADE AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into tnis / day cf August,
2000, by and between Amsrican-dairy.com, Inc. ("Seller"), and Milk-King Dairy,
L.C. ("Purchaser")WHEREAS, the Seller is the record owner and holder of the issue d and
outstanding shares of the capita! stockofAmerican-dairy.com, inc.
("Corporation"), a Utah corporation, which Corporation has issued capital stock of
10,000,000 shares of .001 cents par value common stock; and
WHEREAS, the Purchaser desires to purchase said stock and the Seller
desires to sell said stock, upon the terms and subject to the conditions hereinafter
set forth;
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and
agreements contained in this Agreement, and in order to consummate the
purchase and the sale of the Corporation's Stock aforementioned, it is hereby
agreed as follows:
1. PURCHASE AND SALE:
Subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, at the closing of
the transaction contemplated hereby, the Seller shall sell, convey, transfer, and
deliver to the Purchaser certificates representing such stock, and the Purchaser
shall purchase from the Seller the Corporation's Stock in consideration of the
purchase price set forth in this Agreement. The certificates representing the
Corporation's Stock shall be duly endorsed for transfer or accompanied by
appropriate stock transfer powers duly executed in blank Jp-ejther case with
signatures guaranteed in the customary fashion. The closing of the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement ("Closing"), shall be held at 220 South 200 East,
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on August 3, 2000, at 1:00 p.m., or such
other place, date and time as the parties hereto may otherwise agree.
2. AMOUNT AIM D PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PKiCE.
The total consideration and method of payment thereof are fully set out in
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof.
3. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER.
Seller hereby warrants and represents:
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(a) Organization and Standing. Corporation is a corporation duly
organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of
Utah and has the corporate power and authority to carry on its business as it is no
being conducted.
(b) Restrictions on Stock.
I. The Seller is not a party to any agreement, written or oral, creating
rights in respect to the Corporation's Stock in any third person or relating to the
voting of the Corporation's Stock.
II. Seller is the lawfu! owner of the Stock, free and ciear of ail
security interests, liens, encumbrances, equities and other charges.
III. There are no existing warrants, options, stock purchase
agreements, redemption agreements, restrictions or any nature, calls or rights to
subscribe of any character relating to the stock, nor are there any securities
convertible into such stock.
4. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER AND
PURCHASER.
Seiier and Purchaser hereby represent and warrant that there has been no
act or omission by Seller, Purchaser or the Corporation which would give rise to
any vaiid claim against any of the parties hereto for a brokerage commission,
finder's fee, or other like payment in connection with the transactions
contemplated hereby.
5. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
(a) Entire Agreement. This Agreement (including the exhibits hereto and
any written amendments hereof executed by the parties) constitutes the entire
Agreement and supersedes all prior agreements and understandings, oral and
written, between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof.
(b) Sections and Other Headings. The section and other headings
contained in this Agreement are for reference purposes only and shall not affect
the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement.'
(c) Governing Lav/. This agreement, and all transactions contemplated
hereby, shall be governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the

laws of the Staie of Utah. The parties herein waive thai by jury and agree to
submit to the personal jurisdiction and venue of a court of subject matter
jurisdiction located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. In the event that litigation
results from cr arises out of this Agreement or the performance ihereol, the
parties agree to reimburse the prevailing party's reasonable attorney's fees, court
costs, and all other expenses, whether or not taxable by the court as costs, in
addition to any other relief to which the prevailing party may be entitled.
6. OPTION TO PURCHASER.
Purchaser shall have the option to sell the stock that it purchased under
this Agreement back to Seller for the following consideration:
(a) Reconveyance by deed of all the real properties iisted on Exhibit A that
had been conveyed under this Agreement, subject to debt not to exceed the
balance of the debt that was existing at the time of this Agreement less
reasonable reduction for principal and interest payments from the time of this
Agreement.
(b) Reconveyance by bil! of sale of all the personal properties and
equipment iisted on Exhibit A that had been conveyed under this Agreement,
subject to debt not to exceed the balance of the debt that was existing at the time
of this Agreement less reasonable reduction for principal and interest payments
from the time of this Agreement.
(c) Improvements since this Agreement.
Purchaser, upon the exercise of the option herein, agrees to reimburse
Seller for the w^iua of improy^r^.oiaio the dairy operations from the time of this
Agreement to the date of the exercise of Purchaser's option.
I. Cows: Purchaser shall reimburse Seller for all costs and expenses
in connection with the purchase of cows purchased by American-dairy.com from
the time of this Agreement. _ If the cows are financed, the parties shall take all
necessary steps, if permitted by the financing institution to qualify Purchaser to
assume the indebtedness on the cows.
II. Equipment including computer and internet: Purchaser shall
reimburse Seller for the cost of all equipments installed or purchased by Seller
since the time of this Agreement.
The parties acknowledge that pursuant to the exercise of this option to

repurchase, that Purchaser desires, if possible, to acquire and/or continue to
operate its dairy business with the cows and equipment acquired by Seiier.
However, the Purchaser cannot be compelled to assume any financing or pay
ccsts if Purchaser is unable, if the financing on the cows and equipment cannot
be assured, the Seller and Purchaser agree to work together insofar as possible,
to let Purchasers opera:e with the existing financing on them. The aforesaid is
subject to rights of any financial institution having a lien on or an interest in the
cows and equipment.
The Purchaser has the right to exercise this option if, after a reasonable
time and in no event more than two years from the time of this Agreement,
American-dairy.com, Inc. has not registered its stock for a public offering.
7. DIRECTORSHIP.
Purchaser shall have the right to appoint one member of the Board of
Directors. Such member will be in addition to the presently constituted board of
directors.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed by each of
the individual parties hereto on the date first above written.
AME.

DA1RY.COM, INC.

MILK-KING DAIRY, LC.
si L
By: L / ^ w 4 v { A v'
J^MES L. YOU
Managing Me
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EXHisrrA'
AMOUNT AND PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRiCE
(a) Consideration.
As total consideration for the purchase and sale of the Corporation's Stock,
pursuant to this Agreement, the Purchaser shall pay to the Seller the sum of Two
Hundred Thousand Dollars (3200,000), in trade for ina equivalent sum
representing equity in Miik-King Dairy, L.C., properties and equipment. Such total
consideration to be referred to in this Agreement as the "Purchase Price".
(b) Payment.
1.
The deed to the following real properties shall be duly
executed and delivered to American-dairy.com at the time of dosing:
The rsa' nronertv comTislnn the Milk Kino Farms L.C. dairv cognation
as set forth in the attached Deed and legal description
2.

The bill of sale for the following persona! properties and

equipment:
See the Exhibit attached to that Bill of Sale attached hereto.
The stock shall be issued as follows:
Ronald R. Myers
James L. Young

150,000 shares
50,000 shares

SCHEDULE "A"

John Deer 7200 Tractor
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Schuler 4910 Vertical Mixsr UA
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Double -12 parallel milk parlor and associated equipment,
including stalls, milking units, milk transfer equipment, it*
milk storage and cooling equipment
/
Hsatwatch Electronic Heat Detection System 11,
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Scoopmobile LD-7 Loader
Allis Chalmers 7030 Tractor
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